










The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research  focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 
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Out-of-pocket health expenditures in Australia are high in international comparisons and 
have been growing at a faster rate than most other health costs in recent years. This raises 
concerns about the extent to which out-of-pocket costs have constrained access to health 
services for low income households. Using data from the ABS Household Expenditure 
Survey 2003-04, we model the relationships between health expenditure shares and 
equivalised total expenditure for categories of out-of-pocket health expenditures and 
analyse the extent of protection given by concession cards. To allow for flexibility in the 
relationship we adopt a semi-parametric estimation technique following Yatchew (1997).  
We find mixed evidence for the protection health concession cards give against high out-
of-pocket health expenditures. Despite higher levels of subsidy, households with 
concession cards have higher total health expenditure shares than other households. 
Surprisingly, the major drivers of the difference are not categories of expenditure where 
cards offer little or no protection, such as dental services and non-prescription medicines, 
but prescriptions costs, where concession cards guarantee a subsidy, and specialist 
consultations, where bulk billing rates would be expected to be higher for cardholders. 
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1. Introduction 
The unpredictable nature of adverse health events and the highly skewed distribution of health care 
expenditures make self insurance largely infeasible. As a result every OECD health system is financed 
through a mix of tax-financed public insurance, private insurance and out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. 
The mix of funding sources has an important bearing on the equity of the system. For example, a major 
reliance on financing health care through OOP payments is likely to disadvantage lower income 
households because patient’s ability to access the system is constrained by their ability to pay for health 
care. It may also result in horizontal inequity in relation to health status (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 
2000). Given the well-established empirical relationship between income and health, poorer sections of 
the community are likely to need relatively more health care than those on higher incomes and face higher 
burdens from OOP payments. 
By international standards, Australia has a heavy reliance on OOP payments to finance its health care. 
This is despite Medicare which gives universal access to free or subsidised health care services and 
products. Figure 1 shows international comparisons of per capita OOP payments devoted to health care in 
2002. For comparative purposes, national currencies are converted to USD using the OECD’s purchasing 
power parity (PPP) exchange rate.  Out of the 28 OECD member countries for which data are available, 
Australia ranks fourth highest in per capita OOP costs (OECD, 2006).   
In 2003-04, $75.8 billion or 9.7% of the Australia’s GDP was devoted to health care, and over the 
previous ten years health expenditure increased by an average of 4.6% per annum. Figure 2 shows that 
over the last decade OOP payments have grown more rapidly than any other source of health care funding 
(AIHW, 2005). Australians are spending more on their health care and are increasingly financing this 
expenditure through OOP payments. Aggregate statistics indicate that in 2003-04 the proportion of 
recurrent health expenditure financed through OOP payments was 21.4%, about three times the private 
health insurance share. The Australian government funded 46.5% of total health expenditure and state and 
local government, 20.3%. The OOP component represents about $810 per capita with the largest 
proportions going towards non-prescription pharmaceuticals and dental health services (AIHW 2005, 
Table S38). Not surprisingly, both of these areas of expenditure are characterised by a lack of a publicly 
funded programs. 
The Australian health care system is characterised by mix of services and products some provided free of 
charge, some at very little charge and some at full cost. Apart from public hospitals, health care services 
are to a large extent privately provided and paid for on a fee-for-service basis. Private providers have the 
right to determine their own fees. In the presence of a tax funded system, this could be a recipe for 
escalating public health care costs.   However, the Australian government has controlled demand by 
setting fixed subsidies for medical services and has put in place several restrictions on what medicines 
and procedures it subsidies and how much it pays for them.  
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There is an enormous degree of complexity around who gets charged for what service or product.  For 
example, some GPs seek zero patient contributions for all their services, some GPs charge a patient 
contribution for all their services and some GPs charge some of their patients. Specialists are far less 
likely to bulk bill than GPs. This complexity means that all Australians face a substantial risk of being 
charged OOP costs for their health care however the level of OOPs depends not so much on the amount 
of health care purchased but the type of service and its location.  To counter this risk, some additional 
measures have been put in place to protect individuals and households from high OOP costs. Eligible 
Australians can apply for a range of concession cards that entitle them to higher government subsidies for 
some medical services and products. Concession cards are an essential part of these protective measures 
because they provide additional subsidies for the most vulnerable groups in society, those on low 
incomes, the elderly or people with a disability or with special needs.  
To date, there has been very little research and analysis of the distribution of OOP costs in Australia.  
Most government agencies focus their reporting on aggregate measures such as the percentage of services 
with zero OOP costs over time, by profession and by region (Australian Department of Health and Aged 
Care, 2000; Britt, Valenti et al. 2001; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. 2005; Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare. 2006). Of fifteen studies that analysed OOP costs in Australia published 
between 1990 and 2006, nine focused on OOP costs associated with particular diseases, such as stroke or 
childhood cancer (Fan, Boldy et al. 1997; March and Bachmeier 1997; Lapsley, March et al. 2001; 
Jenner, Campbell et al. 2002; March, Cross et al. 2002; Cohn, Goodenough et al. 2003; Hall and Hendrie 
2003; Dewey, Thrift et al. 2004; March, Cross et al. 2004). Four studies examined the OOP costs 
associated with GP consultations, including one study that examined costs for different income groups 
(Young, Dobson et al. 2000; Young, Dobson et al. 2001; Arnold 2003; Young and Dobson 2003).  One 
study estimated the personal cost of attending breast screening services and another surveyed patients 
about the extent to which prescription co-payments imposed a barrier to access (Hurley and Livingston 
1991; Doran, Robertson et al. 2004).  
This is the first Australian study to examine how health-related OOP costs vary across the distribution of 
household total expenditure and the extent to which concession cards provide protection from OOP 
costs. Section 2 of the paper describes the institutional health care arrangements in Australia and the 
eligibility conditions and entitlements of health care concession cards. Using data from the ABS 
Household Expenditure Survey 2003-04, we model the relationships between health expenditure shares 
and per capita total expenditure. To allow for flexibility in the relationship we adopt a semi-parametric 
estimation technique following Yatchew (1997). The model and empirical strategy are outlined in section 
3 and in section 4 we describe the data.  Results are presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Policy setting  
The Australian health care system involves a complex set of arrangements and interactions between the 
public and private sectors.  Government health policy objectives include the provision of tax-financed 
medical services, medicines and acute health care for all Australians under Medicare and a commitment 
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to a viable private health industry to improve the choice of health services for Australians. 
(Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing, 2003-04) The Australian Government has 
responsibility for medical services and pharmaceutical benefits. The State and Territory governments own 
and operate public hospitals; however, there is a significant Commonwealth contribution to public 
hospital operating costs, negotiated through five yearly Australian Health Care Agreements.  
All Australian residents are entitled to free public hospital treatment anywhere in Australia. Public 
patients treated in public hospitals forego choice of medical provider and are treated by specialists paid by 
the hospital. Specialists may be private practitioners, paid on a sessional (or hourly) basis for treatment of 
public patients, or salaried staff specialists. Most private patients are admitted to private hospitals but 
specialists treating public patients can also admit private patients in public hospitals.  
Apart from doctors treating public inpatients, most medical services are provided by private practitioners 
paid on a fee-for-service basis. Doctors set their own fee for each medical service provided, and the 
Australian Government effectively sets a floor price through the Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS) via a 
fixed rate of subsidy. In 2003-04 the government reimbursed doctors at 75% of the MBS fee for private 
inpatient services whether in a public or private hospital, and 85% for out-of-hospital services. If doctors 
accept the government reimbursement as the full fee the patient incurs no OOP charge. This is known as 
bulk billing. If the practitioner does not bulk bill, any charge above the MBS reimbursement is charged to 
the patient.  OOP payments for doctor visits vary by area of residence and medical specialty.  At the end 
of 2003, 66% of GP visits were bulk-billed, with the lowest rate in the ACT (34%) and the highest in 
NSW (75%). Most patients incur an OOP cost for specialist consultations. For example, bulk-billing rates 
in December 2003 were 27% for specialist consultations, 10% for anaesthetics, 41% for operations and 
20% for obstetrics. There was also a  Medicare Safety Net which  paid 100% of the Medicare fee 
schedule (as opposed to the normal 85%) when families’ annual aggregate gap payment (the difference 
between the schedule fee and amount charged) exceeded a threshold. A number of new bulk billing 
incentives were implemented in 2003-04: MedicarePlus provided higher payments (an increase from $5 
to $7.50) to medical practitioners bulk billing children and concession cardholders, and for services 
provided in areas classified as rural and remote, some outer metropolitan areas, and Tasmania. In 
addition, the reforms increased MBS fees, as well as increasing the Medicare subsidy for GP visits to 
100% of the MBS fee. 
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, PBS, provides subsidised access to listed medicines. In 2003-04 
the total cost of the scheme was $5,607.5 million and it provided 165.4 million prescriptions. In 2003 the 
prescription copayment was $23.10 for general patients and $3.70 for concessional patients. Once annual 
OOP expenditure reached specified thresholds ($708.40 for general patients and $192.40 for cardholders) 
the OOP payment per prescription fell to zero for concessional patients and to the concessional rate for 
general patients. In 2003-04, 83% of all prescriptions and 72% of overall costs of the PBS were 
concessional.  
  3 
Dental services in Australia are almost entirely privately provided under fee-for-service private practice 
arrangements. State and Territory governments operate some public dental services with an emphasis on 
emergency care for low income groups. The Commonwealth initiated a public dental health program for 
prevention and treatment for the same target group in 1994 but it was discontinued in 1996.  
The extent to which consumers face OOP costs for devices, prosthesis, aids and appliances (appliances 
from here on) depends on a range of factors. Consumers face zero OOP for appliances received as part of 
a public inpatient episode. For private inpatient episodes, consumers face zero OOP cost if the device is 
listed on the Australian Government’s no-gap list. In June 2007, consumers made OOP payments for 
approximately 10% of 9,000 devices. For appliances provided outside of the hospital setting, consumers 
face the majority of costs. In 2002-03, consumers paid 78% of the $2.3 billion spent on appliances in the 
out-of-hospital setting through OOP payments. Private health insurers contributed approximately 10% for 
consumers with ancillary insurance. The Australian Government’s hearing services program accounts for 
the majority of public expenditure on appliances.  
Health insurance can be purchased to cover out-of-pocket costs associated with private inpatient treatment 
in either private or public hospitals and to cover other procedures and items such as prostheses and 
devices provided to private in-patients, and ancillary services which include dental care, allied health 
services and complementary care. Depending on agreements between insurers, private hospitals and 
medical specialists, private inpatients may face zero (no-gap) or specified (known-gap) OOP payments.  
Concession cardholders are entitled to a range of additional subsidies and reduced prices for health care 
services and products, depending on the type of card they have.  Table 1 lists the available health 
concession cards, their eligibility rules as well as the cardholders’ entitlements.  Eligibility for a 
pensioner, health care and seniors’ health care card is primarily linked to whether an individual or 
household is a recipient of qualifying government benefits such as the age or disability allowance or are 
in receipt of specified allowance and have sufficiently low income to qualify for the full rate of Family 
Tax Benefit Part A. Veterans of Australia’s defence forces who have qualifying service may be eligible to 
one of the three types of DVA cards. 
Every concession card entitles the card holder to the concessional rate for listed prescription medicines. 
The Safety Net card provides further subsidies for families who accrue high OOP expenses from 
prescription medicines through the. Some cardholders are also entitled to free hearing services and aids. 
DVA cardholders may be entitled to a wider range of subsidies. DVA ‘Gold’ cardholders do not face any 
OOP costs for their health care services as long as the provider agrees to charge patients in line with DVA 
arrangements. In general, these arrangements are more generous than similar government subsidies aimed 
at the general population. ‘White’ cardholders have similar entitlements but only if the service or product 
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3. Model and empirical strategy  
The focus of this paper is the form of the relationship linking health OOP expenditure shares and total 
expenditure, that is, Engel curve estimation. Engel curves can be estimated parametrically, however even 
flexible parametric specifications, such as Piglog, can fail to capture relationships inherent in the data. 
The relationship between expenditure share and log of expenditure may be quite non-linear if households’ 
responses to increases in total expenditure change across the distribution. For example, households at the 
lower end of the distribution may derive a larger health gain from a given health expenditure compared 
with those higher in the distribution. To better understand the relationship between health care demand 
and total expenditure, it is important to use an estimation technique that allows the full range of 
responses. Nonparametric estimation methods, such as the lowess (locally weighted scatterplot 
smoothing) estimator of Cleveland (1979), makes no assumptions about functional form and so achieves 
this goal (see Delgado and Robinson, 1992).  However nonparametric regressions are generally limited to 
the analysis of bivariate relationships. If relevant covariates are omitted, nonparametric estimates may be 
biased. For example, if age positively affects demand for health care and negatively affects total 
expenditures, excluding age would cause an upward bias in the estimated coefficient on expenditures at 
low expenditures and a downward bias at high expenditures. When there are many potential regressors, 
fully nonparametric analysis becomes impractical and it is common to estimate a semi-parametric model 
which combines parametric and nonparametric components.   
We estimate a partial linear model using the semi-parametric approach of Yatchew (1997). The dependent 
variable is the  jth out-of-pocket health expenditure share for household i,  . The conditional mean 
expenditure share is a linear regression function of a number of controls,  and a non-linear function of 
the log of equivalised total household expenditure, 
ij w
i z
( ) ( ) i j x g ln . The forms of the function   are 
unspecified: 
() . j g
 (1)      [ ] ( ) ε β + + = i j ij i i i ij x g z x z w E ln ,  
For each health expenditure share, the data is ordered by equivalised household expenditure and 
differencing is used to remove the non-parametric effects of total expenditure. The parameters,β , of the 
linear component of the model are estimated on the differenced data. The parameters are then applied to 
the non-differenced data and subtracted from the expenditure share. The form of the function between the 
adjusted share and the log of equivalised total household expenditure is estimated non-parametrically. 
(2)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ij i j ij i j ij ij i ij i ij x g x g z z w ε ε β β β + ≅ + + − = − ln ln ˆ ˆ   
The approximation in equation (2) holds because  converges sufficiently quickly to β ˆ β .  
The Yatchew partially linear model is a development of the procedure of Robinson (1988). The Yatchew 
approach eliminates the necessity for non-parametric estimation of the relationship between each of the 
control variables in the parametric component of the model and total expenditure. Partially linear models 
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have been adopted in many applied settings. Yatchew (1997) includes an application investigating the 
relationship between electricity distribution costs and scale of operation. Recent applications of partially 
linear techniques include new business startups (Mesnard and Ravallion, 2006), temperature trends (Gao 
and Hawthorne, 2006), systemic inflammatory response syndrome (Liang 2006), the personal computer 
market (Stengos and Zacharias, 2006) and credit foreclosures (Pence, 2006).  
Engel curve applications more closely related to this paper include Bhalotra and Attfield (1998) and 
Blundell, Duncan and Pendakur (1998).  Bhalotra and Attfield use Robinson’s model to estimate semi-
parametric Engel curves for rural Pakistan using a large household survey and estimate the effects of 
household size and composition on consumption patterns. The household composition variables are then 
used to infer patterns of intra-household allocation between children and adults. Blundell et al (1998) 
undertake semi-parametic estimation of Engel curve relationships using data from the British Family 
Expenditure Survey. Yatchew, Sun and Deri (2003) estimate semi-parametric equivalence scales and test 
for base-independence using South African data.  
4. Data 
The Household Expenditure Survey 2003–04 was conducted on a sample of dwellings throughout 
Australia from July 2003 to June 2004. The 6,957 households in the survey were selected from those not 
recently included in an ABS household survey and excluded non–private dwellings (such as hospitals, 
institutions, nursing homes, hotels and hostels) and dwellings in collection districts defined as very 
remote or indigenous communities. Information was collected from all persons aged 15 years and over in 
the selected household. Personal interviews were conducted and survey participants were also required to 
record in a diary all their expenditures over a two week period. 
Total household expenditure, equivalised using the OECD equivalence scale, provides our welfare 
ordering. We exclude expenditures on income tax and mortgage repayments which are often negative and 
delete observations with negative expenditures on transport and on recreation. This leaves a sample of 
6,693 households, of which 2,876 (43%) had access to one or more health concession cards in the 
household.  
Figure 3 presents kernel densities of the distribution of log equivalised household expenditure by card 
status for the sample. Not surprisingly, given the eligibility rules, the density function for cardholders lies 
to the left of that for non-cardholders although there is considerable overlap. Table 2 presents mean 
equivalised total expenditure and mean health expenditures by quintile of equivalised total expenditure 
for the whole sample. The top panel includes all observations and the bottom two panels split the sample 
by card status. In the lowest quintile there are only 240 non-cardholder households (18% of the quintile 
population) and this proportion is reversed in the top quintile. Total health expenditure is lower for 
cardholders in the bottom two quintiles and higher in the top three, with cardholder expenditure in the top 
quintile almost double that of households without concession cards. This difference is driven by a small 
number of cardholder observations with large OOPs for hospital episodes and appliances.  
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Table 3 presents health expenditure shares by quintile for the three groups. These are the dependent 
variables, , of our partial linear model. While the unconditional total health expenditure share is about 
3% across all quintiles, there is a slight fall for households without cards and a rise for those with cards 
across the distribution. The quintile average shares are also generally higher for cardholders. The pattern 
differs across categories of expenditure. GP average shares fall across the distribution, with cardholders’ 
shares being slightly lower in all quintiles. In contrast, specialist shares rise for most of the distribution 
irrespective of card status. Prescription OOP shares fall across the distribution and they are generally 
higher for those with concession cards, despite the concessional co-payment rate and the PBS safety net. 
The shares for dental OOPs are substantially higher for those without concession cards.  
ij w
Many of these differences are likely to be driven by health status, with cardholders being older and in 
poorer health. Doctor fees may also vary by location. Bulk billing rates tend to be higher in cities than 
regional areas, particularly for GP visits. In the parametric part of the partial linear model we control for 
age and location. Table 4 presents means of the control variables for the whole sample and by card status. 
The age distribution is very different by card status; cardholders are about 15 years older on average in 
every quintile. There appears to be little difference between the two groups by location, either by state of 
residence or region. 
The proportion of zero expenditures in the data varies by expenditure category and card status.  Of 
households with a health concession card, 11% have zero total health expenditures over the two-week 
diary period, compared with 7% for households with no card. Higher proportions of zero GP expenditures 
for cardholders could arise from either lower use or a higher rate of bulk billing. The proportions of zero 
expenditure on specialist visits and over-the-counter medicines are very similar for the two groups. This 
contrasts with dental expenditures. Cardholders have a lower rate of zero prescription expenditures 
reflecting higher average age and probably a higher incidence of chronic conditions. Only about 3.5% of 
households have non-zero hospital expenditures. Because public treatment in a public hospital is free, 
non-zero hospital expenditures indicate admission as a private patient. The rates do not differ by card 
status which is an unexpected result, given the relative incomes and insurance coverage by card status, 
and despite only DVA cards providing government assistance for private hospital treatment.  
5. Results  
In the semi-parametric specification we include controls for ten year age bands (age 40-49 omitted), state 
of residence (NSW omitted) and a capital city dummy. Age is clearly related to health need and we 
include states to control for varying supply conditions and price regimes. In the 2003-04 HES data items 
relating to health were not collected. 
The data is ordered by equivalised household expenditure and the parameters,β , of the linear component 
of the model are estimated on the differenced data for each health expenditure share for the whole sample 
and separately by card status. (All regression results for these models are available on request from the 
authors.) The parameters estimated on the differenced data are applied to the non-differenced data and the 
predicted linear component of the model is subtracted from the expenditure share. The form of the 
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function between the adjusted share and the log of equivalised total household expenditure is estimated 
using lowess. 
Figure 4 presents the estimated semi-parametric relationships between each health expenditure share and 
log of equivalised total expenditure. Figure 5 presents corresponding results split by card status. Both 
control for age and region. For some health expenditures, the highly non-linear relationships shown in 
Figure 4 arise from combining the two distinct subsamples distinguished by card status. This is 
particularly so for the shares of total health expenditure and allied health. However, for dental 
expenditures both subsamples exhibit quite complex non-linear relationships. Given the Engel curve 
specification, a positive slope of the lowess curve indicates an expenditure elasticity exceeding one and a 
negative slope an elasticity of less than one.  
At the same level of equivalised total expenditure, cardholders generally have higher total health 
expenditure shares than non-cardholders across the middle of the distribution. While the difference in the 
unadjusted level of expenditure is about $4 per week, the corresponding difference in shares adjusted for 
age and location is closer to $2 per week.   
The pattern of expenditure shares varies with subcategories of expenditure. Hospital expenditure shares 
are extremely small for both groups reflecting the low frequency of hospital admissions in the very short 
diary period and the high level of public subsidy for public hospital treatment. Cardholder hospital 
expenditure shares are higher across the whole distribution and tend to rise with expenditure. For the bulk 
of the distribution the two relationships show a closely aligned overall rising pattern.   
For medical practitioners, concession cards might generally be assumed to give protection through moral 
suasion on providers to reduce the size of co-payments or to bulk bill. The results in Figure 5 suggest that 
this is effective for GP consultations but not for specialists. Bulk billing rates are much higher for GP 
visits than for specialists. The level of OOP payment for a GP consultation is unlikely to exceed $30 
however there is greater potential variation in fees for specialist consultations and a single non bulk billed 
visit can involve an OOP payment of hundreds of dollars. While cardholders have higher expenditure 
shares for specialist services, their use of unsubsidised allied health professionals is low relative to other 
households. 
An unexpected result revealed in Figure 5 is the higher expenditure shares for prescription drugs at the 
lower end of the distribution. Neither the PBS concession rate nor the Safety Net appears to provide 
protection against high OOPs for prescriptions for poorer cardholders. For non prescription medicines 
shares across the middle of the distribution are relatively flat for both subsamples.   
There is a very different pattern between dental and optical services which are both largely non-
subsidised. Dental services are found to be a luxury for cardholders. For households without cards, the 
dental share is U-shaped across most of the distribution while for those with cards it is very low for the 
poorest households and then has a rising pattern. Optical shares for non-cardholders are generally 
constant across the distribution but rise for cardholders and for most of the distribution the share is higher.  
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In general prices are likely to be the same for dental and optical services irrespective of card status. Use of 
dental services is relatively low for cardholders for most of the distribution. Cardholders appear to forego 
non-subsidised dental services compared with non-subsidised optical services. This is unlikely to result 
from reimbursement of OOPs via ancillary insurance since non-cardholders are 70% more likely to be 
insured.  
6. Conclusions 
Over 21% of health expenditure was funded by OOP payments in 2003-04. On average this represents 
just over 3% of total household expenditure, 3.4% for households with concession cards and 2.9% for 
those without. Across the middle three quintiles of the distribution and controlling for age and location, 
cardholders have higher total health expenditure shares despite higher levels of subsidy. The major 
drivers of this difference are not categories of expenditure where cards offer little or no protection: dental, 
non-prescription medicines and allied health. They are specialist consultations, appliances and, most 
surprisingly, prescriptions, where concession cards guarantee a subsidy. This suggests that the 
considerably lower prescription co-payment for cardholders is more than offset by higher rates of 
utilisation. It is also unlikely that the lower dental share by cardholders is due to significantly better dental 
health. More likely is that lower dental utilisation is driven by price. The Commonwealth dental program, 
which was targeted on concession card and pension status, was removed in 1996. Since then dental 
expenditures are paid wholly out-of-pocket for those without private insurance and remaining state dental 
programs provide very limited assistance.  Both GPs and specialists have the choice to bulk bill 
concession cardholders and the results in this paper indicate that GPs take up the option more than 
specialists and that this concentrates gains in the lower end of the distribution. Perhaps a greater policy 
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Figure 2: Growth in per capita health care financing by source,  
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Table 1: Health care card eligibility and entitlements 
 
Type Eligibility  Entitlements 
Pensioner  
Concession Card  
(Household) 
  Age or Disability Support Pension, 
Parenting or Carer Payment  
  Mature Age Allowance 
  Age>60 years plus Newstart, Widow, 
Sickness, Parenting or Partner Allow 
  PBS concessional rate 
  Medicare Safety Net lower threshold 
  Hearing services and aids  
Health Care Card  
(Household) 
  A qualifying social security benefit or 
supplementary payment  
  Maximum rate of Family Tax Benefit 
Part A and a Carer (child) or a 
Mobility Allowance. 
  PBS concessional rate 
  Medicare Safety Net lower threshold 
  Hearing services and aids (if in receipt of Sickness 
Allowance) 
Commonwealth  
Seniors Health  
Card  
(Individual) 
  No income support payment, service 
pension or supplement and age-
pension age and taxable income less 
than $50,000 (single) or $80,000 
(couple) 
  PBS concessional rate 
  Medicare Safety Net lower threshold 
 
HIC Safety Net  
Concession Card 
(Household) 
  Concession card holder and PBS-
related OOP costs greater than 
$253.80 
  Free PBS prescriptions 
HIC Safety Net 
Card  
(Household) 
  PBS-related OOP costs greater than  
$960.10 
  PBS concessional rate 




  Veterans : ex-prisoners of war, 
receive disability pension, age or 
invalidity pension and satisfy income 
and asset test and have qualifying 
service 
  PBS concessional rate 
  Medicare Safety Net lower threshold 
  Hearing services and aids 
  All health care services if provider agrees to treat 
under DVA arrangements 




  Veterans: with an accepted war or 
service caused injury or disease, 
malignant cancer, TB, post-traumatic 
stress, anxiety or depression 
  PBS concessional rate 
  Medicare Safety Net lower threshold 
  Hearing services and aids (if in receipt of Sickness 
Allowance) 
  All health care services relating to limited 
conditions if provider agrees to treat under DVA 
arrangements 
DVA Orange Card  
(Individual) 
 
  Veterans: qualifying service from 
WW1 or II, age greater than 70 and 
resident in Australia more than 10 
years. 
  PBS concessional rate 
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Table 2: Health expenditures by quintile of equivalised  
total expenditure and card status ($/week) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
All
Observations 1339 1339 1338 1339 1338
Equivalised total expenditure 203 337 469 631 1,057
Quintile upper bound 275 401 543 740 5,323
Total 9.55 17.00 26.05 33.00 52.98
GP 0.65 1.23 1.75 2.13 2.36
Specialist 0.97 2.49 4.10 5.16 7.55
P r e s c r i p t i o n s 2 . 2 32 . 8 93 . 9 44 . 8 95 . 2 7
Non-prescription medicines 2.69 4.92 5.84 7.43 8.31
Dental 1.58 2.70 5.00 7.00 11.83
O p t i c a l 0 . 4 30 . 9 21 . 3 41 . 3 22 . 2 0
Allied health  0.41 0.86 1.48 2.24 2.97
Appliances 0.14 0.22 0.73 0.92 4.53
Hospital 0.26 0.46 1.26 1.17 7.35
No Card 
Observations 240 570 860 1046 1101
Total 11.11 17.80 24.58 31.60 46.59
GP 0.97 1.72 1.90 2.25 2.55
Specialist 0.95 2.53 3.44 5.25 7.73
P r e s c r i p t i o n s 1 . 7 32 . 9 14 . 0 84 . 4 25 . 2 5
Non-prescription medicines 2.48 4.35 5.46 7.05 8.11
Dental 3.00 3.89 4.81 6.72 12.20
O p t i c a l 0 . 5 00 . 6 71 . 2 51 . 1 22 . 2 5
Allied health  1.06 1.00 1.46 2.33 3.11
Appliances 0.17 0.09 0.86 0.69 1.11
Hospital 0.24 0.37 0.88 1.01 3.65
Card 
Observations 1099 769 478 293 237
Total 9.21 16.41 28.70 38.00 82.68
GP 0.57 0.88 1.48 1.69 1.49
Specialist 0.98 2.46 5.29 4.83 6.73
P r e s c r i p t i o n s 2 . 3 42 . 8 83 . 7 16 . 5 65 . 3 5
Non-prescription medicines 2.74 5.35 6.54 8.77 9.22
Dental 1.27 1.82 5.33 8.01 10.11
O p t i c a l 0 . 4 21 . 1 11 . 4 92 . 0 31 . 9 8
Allied health  0.26 0.75 1.52 1.92 2.30
Appliances 0.13 0.31 0.49 1.73 20.46
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
All
T o t a l 3 . 3 33 . 0 73 . 3 33 . 0 52 . 9 5
GP 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.14
S p e c i a l i s t 0 . 3 40 . 4 50 . 5 20 . 4 60 . 4 6
Prescriptions 0.84 0.54 0.51 0.48 0.33
Non-prescription medicines 0 . 9 20 . 9 30 . 7 40 . 6 80 . 5 1
Dental 0.49 0.45 0.64 0.62 0.69
Optical 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.13
Allied health  0.14 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.18
Appliances 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.15
H o s p i t a l 0 . 1 00 . 0 80 . 2 00 . 1 00 . 3 1
No Card 
T o t a l 3 . 5 02 . 8 63 . 0 32 . 8 62 . 8 2
 
GP 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.15
S p e c i a l i s t 0 . 3 00 . 3 60 . 4 00 . 4 60 . 4 7
Prescriptions 0.63 0.50 0.53 0.44 0.32
Non-prescription medicines 0 . 7 20 . 7 30 . 6 70 . 6 30 . 5 0
Dental 0.89 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.71
Optical 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14
Allied health  0.34 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.18
Appliances 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.07
H o s p i t a l 0 . 0 80 . 0 60 . 1 20 . 0 90 . 2 3
Card 
T o t a l 3 . 2 93 . 2 33 . 8 63 . 7 33 . 5 5
GP 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.10
S p e c i a l i s t 0 . 3 50 . 5 10 . 7 30 . 4 70 . 4 3
Prescriptions 0.88 0.57 0.49 0.64 0.35
Non-prescription medicines 0 . 9 71 . 0 70 . 8 60 . 8 60 . 5 6
Dental 0.41 0.34 0.72 0.79 0.62
Optical 0.12 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.12
Allied health  0.10 0.13 0.21 0.19 0.14
Appliances 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.19 0.50
H o s p i t a l 0 . 1 00 . 1 00 . 3 30 . 1 50 . 7 1
 
Table 3: Health expenditure shares (%) by quintile of  
equivalised total expenditure and card status  
Table 4: Means of control variables by quintile of equivalised  
total expenditure and card status  
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
age lt 30 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06
age 30 to 39 0.13 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.08
age 40 to 49 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.16
age 50 to 59 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.22
age 60 to 69 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.29
age 70 to 79 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.12
age gt 79 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.05
nsw 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.28
vic 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.22
qld 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.12
sa 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11
wa 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.12
tas 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08
nt/act 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08
capital city 0.56 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.62
All No Card  Card 
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